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Abstract
We model the investigation of criminal activity as a principal-agent-monitor prob-
lem in which the agent can corrupt the monitor and side-contract to destroy evidence.
Building on insights from La↵ont and Martimort (1997) we study whether the principal
can benefit from endogenously creating asymmetric information between the agent and
the monitor. We show that the principal can benefit from randomizing the incentives
given to the monitor (and letting those serve as the monitor’s private information), but
that the optimality of random incentives depends on pre-existing patterns of private
information. We address the issue by providing a data-driven framework for policy
evaluation that requires only unverified report data. A potential local policy change
is an improvement if, everything else equal, it is associated with greater reports of crime.
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1 Introduction
Agents potentially engaging in criminal behavior can undermine institutions by corrupting
monitors in charge of investigating them. This paper explores the idea that corruption can
be weakened by introducing endogenous asymmetric-information frictions between colluding
parties. Building on seminal work by La↵ont and Martimort (1997), we show that the
cost of deterring crime can be reduced by randomizing the incentives given to the monitor,
and letting the magnitude of those incentives serve as the monitor’s private information
vis-a`-vis the agent. While potential e ciency gains can be significant, the optimality of
random incentives depends on pre-existing patterns of asymmetric information. To facilitate
policy design, we propose a data-driven framework for prior-free policy evaluation: although
aggregate reports by monitors cannot be na¨ıvely used to measure actual criminal activity, we
show how to evaluate policy changes using unverified report data. The main takeaway is that
a potential local policy change is an improvement if, everything else equal, it is associated
with greater reports of crime.
We study a game between three players — a principal, an agent, and a monitor — in
which the agent chooses whether or not to engage in criminal behavior c 2 {0, 1}. The
behavior of the agent is not observed by the principal, but is observed by a monitor who
submits report m 2 {0, 1}. We think of this report as evidence leading to prosecution:
report m = 1 triggers an exogenous judiciary process which imposes a cost k on criminal
agents; report m = 0 (which involves suppression of evidence whenever c = 1) triggers no
such process. Although the principal cannot observe the agent’s behavior, she can detect
misreporting m 6= c with probability q. The principal’s only policy control is the e ciency
wage w provided to the monitor.
We allow for collusion between the agent and the monitor at the reporting stage (i.e.
corruption). In particular, the monitor can destroy evidence (report message m = 0) incrim-
inating a criminal agent in exchange for a bribe. We think of the destruction of evidence
as happening in front of the agent, so that there is no moral-hazard between the agent and
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the monitor. As a result, collusion boils down to a bilateral trading problem. Exploiting
the classic insight that asymmetric information may prevent e cient trade and limits collu-
sion (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983, La↵ont and Martimort, 1997), we study the extent
to which the principal can reduce the cost of incentive provision by creating endogenous
asymmetric information between the agent and the monitor.
Our model fits a broad class of environments in which an uninformed principal is con-
cerned about collusion between her monitor and the agents the monitor is supposed to
investigate. This includes many of the settings that have been brought up in the empirical
literature on corruption, for instance collusion between polluting firms and environmental
inspectors (Duflo et al., 2013), tax-evaders and customs o cers (Fisman and Wei, 2004),
public works contractors and local o cials (Olken, 2007), organized crime and police o -
cers (Punch, 2009), and so on. In these settings the principal cannot e ciently monitor
agents directly, but may realistically be able to detect tampered evidence by scrutinizing
accounts, performing random rechecks in person, or obtaining tips from informed parties.
Alternatively, the principal may be able to detect misreporting if crime has delayed but ob-
servable consequences, such as environmental pollution, public infrastructure failures, media
scandals, and so on.
Our analysis emphasizes three sets of results. The first is that although deterministic in-
centive schemes are cheap in the absence of collusion, they can become excessively expensive
once collusion is allowed. E cient contracting between the agent and the monitor forces the
principal to raise the monitor’s wage to the point where the agent and the monitor’s joint
surplus from misreporting becomes negative. By using random incentives, the principal can
reduce the rents of criminal agents, which lowers the cost of incentive provision. We make
this point using a simple example without pre-existing asymmetric information. In this case,
the cost-savings from using random rather than deterministic incentives are large, in excess
of 50% under plausible parameter specifications.
Our second set of results qualifies these optimistic findings by considering environments
with pre-existing asymmetric information. In addition to the incentives provided by the
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principal, the monitor experiences an exogenous privately-observed idiosyncratic cost ⌘   0
for accepting a bribe. We show that the optimality of random incentives depends on the
convexity or concavity of the c.d.f. F⌘ of idiosyncratic costs ⌘. If it is convex over a su ciently
large support, additional asymmetric information is counter-productive.
Finally, motivated by the fact that optimal policy depends crucially on fine details of
the environment, we study the possibility of performing prior-free policy evaluations using
reporting data from a population of agent-monitor pairs. We consider a principal who has
limited knowledge about the parameters of the environment, and hence cannot infer levels of
crime from reporting and misreporting data. We first show that aggregate reports of crime
across di↵erent incentive schemes do not allow for reliable policy evaluation. Indeed, reports
of crime depend on both underlying crime rates, and the monitors’ decisions to report crime
or not. As a result, it is possible that a new incentive scheme decreases aggregate reports of
crime, while in fact increasing underlying crime rates. Nevertheless, we show it is possible
to perform prior-free local policy evaluations using conditional report data from a single
policy (i.e. average reports of crime conditional on realized incentives). Somewhat counter-
intuitively, a local policy change improves on a reference incentive scheme if it is associated
with higher rates of reported crime. This clarifies that na¨ıvely inferring crime from reporting
data leads to incorrect policy recommendations.
This paper and its companion, Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (2016), both explore the
idea that collusion may be addressed by exploiting informational frictions that make side-
contracting di cult. The two papers consider di↵erent frictions and emphasize di↵erent
policy channels. This paper focuses on asymmetric information between the monitor and the
agent, and emphasizes endogenous bargaining failures. Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (2016)
focuses on moral hazard and emphasizes endogenous imperfect monitoring. It departs from
the assumption that reports are contractible, so that the monitor is subject to moral hazard.
The agent must incentivize her preferred report by committing to a retaliation strategy. To
allow information transmission, the principal must limit the information content of her own
response to the monitor’s reports. Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (2016) also attempts to
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address the question of policy evaluation. Under the requirement that data from several
experiments is available, it shows how to obtain bounds on treatment e↵ects using unverified
reports.
On the applied side, this paper relates to and hopes to usefully complement the growing
empirical literature on corruption. We address two aspects of the problem which have been
emphasized in the literature, for instance in the recent survey by Olken and Pande (2012).1
The first is that the e↵ectiveness of incentive schemes may be very di↵erent over the short-
run and the long-run: over time, agents will find ways to corrupt the investigators in charge
of monitoring them. We explicitly take into account the possibility of collusion between
agents and monitors and propose ways to reduce the cost it imposes on organizations. A
second di culty brought up by Olken and Pande (2012) is that reports of criminal behavior
do not provide a reliable measure of underlying crime. Our structural model allows us to
back-out measures of underlying crime using observed reports. This connects our work to
a small set of papers on structural experiment design (see for instance Karlan and Zinman
(2009), Ashraf et al. (2010), Chassang et al. (2012), Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel (2016),
Berry et al. (2012)) that take guidance from structural models to design experiments whose
outcome measures can be used to infer unobservable parameters of interest.
On the theory side, our work fits in the literature on collusion in mechanism design
initiated by Tirole (1986). It is especially related to La↵ont and Martimort (1997, 2000) and
Che and Kim (2006, 2009), who emphasize the role of asymmetric information in limiting
the extent of collusion.2 Our contribution is two-fold. First, we show that the principal can
potentially benefit from introducing endogenous asymmetric information through random
incentives.3 Second, as a step towards implementation, we show how to evaluate potential
1For recent work on the measurement of corruption, see Bertrand et al. (2007), and Olken (2007). See
also the surveys by Banerjee et al. (2013) and Zitzewitz (2012).
2For more on the large literature on collusion in mechanism design, see Felli and Villa-Boas (2000),
Faure-Grimaud et al. (2003), Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004), Burguet and Che (2004), Pavlov (2008),
Celik (2009) or Che et al. (2013).
3This relates our paper to a recent literature that studies optimal design of information structures; see,
for instance, Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), Bergemann et al. (2015),
Condorelli and Szentes (2016).
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policy changes using only unverified reports. Also related is Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (1998),
who suggest a distinct mechanism through which random wages (to the agent) may help
reduce collusion. They consider a setting in which the agent has no resources of her own, so
that any promised payment to the monitor must come from the wage she obtains from the
principal. When that is the case, randomizing the agent’s wages undermines her ability to
commit to transfers.4
Other work has underlined the usefulness of random incentives for reasons unrelated
to collusion. In Becker and Stigler (1974) random checks are an optimal response to non-
convex monitoring costs. More recently, in work on police crackdowns, Eeckhout et al.
(2010) show that in the presence of budget constraints, it may be optimal to provide high
powered incentives to a fraction of a population of agents rather than weak incentives to the
entire population.5 In contrast to our analysis, incentives in Eeckhout et al. (2010) must be
public information. High powered incentives are useful only if concerned agents are aware
of them. In addition, Myerson (1986) and more recently Rahman (2012) emphasize the role
of random messaging and random incentives in mechanisms, in particular in settings where
the principal needs to disentangle the behavior of di↵erent parties.6
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our framework. Section 3 stud-
ies a special case of our model with no pre-existing private information, and delineates the
economic forces that make random incentives useful. Section 4 extends the analysis to envi-
ronments with pre-existing asymmetric information, and shows that additional asymmetric
information need not always be optimal. Section 5 proposes an approach to policy-evaluation
4Also relevant is the work of Basu (2011) and Basu et al. (2014) which highlights the value of asymmetric
punishments as a way to make collusion more di cult.
5See Lazear (2006) for related results.
6Other papers have emphasized the role of random incentives. Rahman and Obara (2010) demonstrate
that random messages can improve incentive provision in partnerships by allowing to identify innocent
individuals. Jehiel (2012) shows that a principal may benefit from maintaining her agent uninformed about
payo↵ relevant features of the environment, as this may induce higher e↵ort at states at which she values
e↵ort most. In a multi-tasking setting, Ederer et al. (2013) show that random contracts may be e↵ective
in incentivizing the agent to take a balanced e↵ort profile. In a monopoly pricing context, Calzolari and
Pavan (2006a,b) show that a monopolist may benefit from selling to di↵erent types of buyers with di↵erent
probabilities to increase the buyers’ ability to extract revenue on a secondary market.
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relying on naturally occurring report data. Section 6 — further developed in the Online Ap-
pendix — discusses several extensions to our model including: more sophisticated contract-
ing between the principal and monitor, e cient incomplete-information bargaining between
the monitor and agent, extortion from non-criminal agents, and settings in which monitor
and agent interact before the agent chooses whether or not to engage in crime. Proofs are
collected in Appendix A unless mentioned otherwise.
2 Framework
Players, actions, and payo↵s. We consider a game with three players: a principal, an
agent, and a monitor. The agent decides whether to engage in criminal behavior c 2 {0, 1},
where crime c = 1 gives the agent a benefit ⇡A > 0 and comes at a cost ⇡P < 0 to the
principal. Benefit ⇡A > 0 is the agent’s private information, and is distributed according to
a c.d.f. F⇡A with density f⇡A and support [⇡A, ⇡A].
The agent’s action is not directly observable to the principal, but is observed by a monitor
who chooses to make a reportm 2 {0, 1} to the principal. We think of this report as evidence
leading to prosecution: report m = 1 triggers a judiciary process that imposes an expected
cost k > ⇡A on criminal agents and an expected cost k0 2 [0, k] on non-criminal agents. This
judiciary process is exogenous and outside the control of the principal.
While reports can be falsified (i.e., the monitor can always send either report, regardless of
the agent’s action), we assume that the principal detects a false reportm 6= c with probability
q 2 (0, 1), which makes reports partially verifiable. Detection may occur through several
channels: for instance accounting discrepancies, random rechecks, or tips from informed
parties. Criminal behavior may also have delayed but observable consequences, such as
environmental pollution. We further assume that the principal is no longer able to punish
a criminal agent after the monitor sends a falsified report m = 0: the evidence needed for
prosecution is no longer available.
The monitor is paid according to a fixed wage contract with wage w, and gets fired in the
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event that the principal finds evidence of misreporting. The monitor is protected by limited
liability and cannot be punished beyond the loss of wages.7 In addition to her expected
wage loss, the monitor incurs a cost ⌘   0 whenever she misreports. Cost ⌘ is the monitor’s
private information, and is distributed according to a c.d.f. F⌘ with density f⌘.
As part of a possible side-contract, the agent can make transfers ⌧   0 to the monitor,
i.e. pay her a bribe. Corruption occurs when the monitor accepts to destroy evidence for a
criminal agent (i.e. sends message m = 0 although c = 1). We assume that crime, rather
than corruption, is the behavior that the principal really cares about. Corruption undermines
the e↵ectiveness of institutions in charge of punishing crime.
Altogether, expected payo↵s uP , uA, and uM respectively accruing to the principal, the
agent, and the monitor take the form:
uP = ⇡P ⇥ c   w ⇥ w    q ⇥ q
uA = ⇡A ⇥ c  [k ⇥ c+ k0 ⇥ (1  c)]⇥m  ⌧
uM = w  [q ⇥ w + ⌘]⇥ 1m 6=c +⌧,
where  w denotes the e ciency cost of raising promised wages and  q captures the principal’s
cost of attention. When the principal is operating under budget or attention constraints,
these costs can be interpreted as shadow prices.
We emphasize that the monitor’s incentives for truthful reporting are captured by the
expected loss from misreporting qw + ⌘. For ease of exposition we treat the distribution of
wages w as the principal’s policy variable. However, our analysis applies without change if
scrutiny q is the relevant policy instrument.
Timing and Commitment. Our analysis contrasts the e↵ectiveness of incentive schemes
under collusion and no-collusion. The timing of actions is as follows.
1. The principal commits to a distribution of wages w with c.d.f. Fw, and draws a random
7The Online Appendix extends the analysis to the case where the principal and monitor can use arbitrary
contracts.
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wage w for the monitor, which is observed by the monitor but not by the agent.
2. The agent chooses whether or not to engage in crime c 2 {0, 1}.
3. Under collusion, with probability   the agent makes the monitor a take-it-or-leave-
it bribe o↵er ⌧ in exchange for sending message m = 0; with probability 1     the
monitor makes the take-it-or-leave-it bribe o↵er. We assume perfect commitment so
that whenever monitor and agent come to an agreement, the monitor does send message
m = 0. Under no-collusion nothing occurs.
4. Under no-collusion or, under collusion if there was no agreement in the previous stage,
the monitor sends the message m maximizing her final payo↵.
We assume for now that parameters k, k0,   and q are common knowledge. We relax this
assumption in Section 5.
We think of non-collusive and collusive environments as respectively capturing short-run
and long-run patterns of behavior. In the short run, the agent may take the monitors’
behavior as given, and not explore the possibility of bribery. In the long run however, as the
agent explores the di↵erent options available to her, she may learn that monitors respond
favorably to bribes.
Population interpretation. Our model admits a natural population interpretation in
which distributions F⌘ and F⇡A capture heterogeneity in the population of monitors and
agents, and monitors and agents are matched independently. Under this interpretation, wage
distribution Fw captures wage heterogeneity among monitors rather than the randomization
of any monitor’s wages.
Motivation. Our framework is intended to capture the challenges facing public agencies
that rely on monitors to assess the behavior of regulated agents. For example, we can think
of the principal as an environmental protection agency (EPA), the agent as an industrial
plant, and the monitor as an investigator employed by the EPA. In this case, the industrial
plant may choose to dump hazardous materials rather than incur the cost of processing
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them.8 Besides environmental protection, other prominent examples include labor safety
regulation, tax collection, health inspections, and tackling organized crime. In these cases,
crime may respectively correspond to maintaining poor safety and health standards, fraud-
ulent accounting, or extortion and smuggling. The monitor may commit not to report the
agent by destroying, or simply by not collecting the evidence needed to initiate a judiciary
process. Even if the monitor makes no report of crime, signals of misbehavior may be
obtained by the principal after some delay: pollution or poor safety standards may lead
to visible consequences (e.g. accidents, local contamination); civil society stakeholders may
produce evidence of their own; aggrieved associates of the agent may volunteer incriminating
information; and so on . . .
Modeling assumptions and extensions. Some of our assumptions are critical to our
results, for instance the fact that the principal can commit to a distribution of incentives
across monitors, or that monitors cannot verifiably disclose their incentives to agents. We
discuss the plausibility of these assumptions in Section 6.
Other assumptions a↵ect the analysis, but do not ultimately change the general thrust
of our message. We clarify these assumptions in Section 6 and, when possible, provide
appropriate extensions in the Online Appendix. This includes extensions to environments
in which bargaining occurs before the agent’s crime decision; environments in which the
principal can o↵er the monitor arbitrary contracts; settings in which the monitor and the
agent can use arbitrary bargaining mechanisms; as well as environments in which the monitor
can extort bribes from non-criminal agents.
8Note that in the US, environmental pollution is indeed subject to criminal prosecu-
tion. The EPA maintains a database of criminal cases resulting from its investigations at
http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/summary-criminal-prosecutions.
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3 Random Wages in a Simple Case
We clarify the potential value of random wages using a simple version of our model in which
all monitors have the same cost of falsifying information ⌘ = 0, and all agents get the same
benefit ⇡A < k from crime. We further assume that the agent has all the bargaining power
at the side-contracting stage, and makes o↵ers with probability   = 1.
Under these assumptions, the expected cost that a monitor with wage w incurs from
accepting a bribe from a criminal agent and sending a false report is qw. Thus, under
collusion, a monitor with wage w accepts a bribe ⌧ from a criminal agent if and only if
⌧ > qw.9 Under no-collusion, or if the monitor rejects the agent’s o↵er, the monitor’s
optimal continuation strategy is to send a truthful report m = c. In particular, the monitor
cannot credibly commit to send report m = 1 when the agent is non-criminal. These
observations imply that, under collusion, the expected payo↵ of a criminal agent of type ⇡A
is ⇡A   k +max⌧ (k   ⌧)prob(qw < ⌧), and the expected payo↵ of a non-criminal agent is 0.
Deterministic wages. We begin by computing the cost of keeping the agent non-criminal
when the principal can use only deterministic wages.
Lemma 1 (collusion and the cost of incentives). Assume that the principal uses only deter-
ministic wages. Under no-collusion the principal can induce the agent to be non-criminal at
0 cost.
Under collusion, the minimum cost of wages needed to induce the agent to be non-criminal
is equal to ⇡Aq .
Proof. Given any wage w, under no-collusion the monitor’s optimal strategy is to send a
truthful report. The agent’s payo↵ from action c = 1 is then ⇡A   k < 0 and her payo↵
from action c = 0 is 0. Thus, under no-collusion the principal can induce the agent to be
non-criminal at zero cost.
9By convention, we assume that the monitor rejects the agent’s o↵er whenever she is indi↵erent between
accepting and rejecting a bribe.
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Consider next a setting with collusion, and note that the monitor accepts a bribe ⌧ from
a criminal agent if and only if ⌧ > qw. The agent’s payo↵ from taking c = 1 is therefore
⇡A  min{k, qw}, while her payo↵ from action c = 0 is 0. It follows that the principal can
induce the agent to take action c = 0 by setting a deterministic wage w = ⇡Aq . ⌅
Lemma 1 shows that, while deterministic incentive schemes work well under no-collusion,
their e↵ectiveness is significantly limited whenever collusion is a possibility. We now show
that by randomizing wage w the principal reduces the e ciency of side-contracting between
the agent and the monitor, and hence reduces the cost of incentive provision.
Proposition 1 (optimal incentives under collusion). Under collusion, the cost-minimizing
wage distribution F ⇤w that induces the agent to be non-criminal is described by
8w 2 [0, ⇡A/q], F ⇤w(w) =
k   ⇡A
k   qw . (1)
The corresponding cost of wages W ⇤(⇡A) ⌘ EF ⇤w [w] is
W ⇤(⇡A) =
⇡A
q

1  k   ⇡A
⇡A
log
✓
1 +
⇡A
k   ⇡A
◆ 
<
⇡A
q
⇥ ⇡A
k
. (2)
The proof of Proposition 1 is instructive.
Proof. A wage distribution Fw induces the agent to be non-criminal if and only if, for every
bribe o↵er ⌧ 2 [0, ⇡A], ⇡A   k + (k   ⌧)prob(⌧ > qw)  0, or equivalently, if and only if, for
every ⌧ 2 [0, ⇡A], Fw
⇣
⌧
q
⌘
 k ⇡Ak ⌧ . Using the change in variable w = ⌧q , we obtain that wage
distribution Fw induces the agent to be non-criminal if and only if,
8w 2 [0, ⇡A/q], Fw(w)  k   ⇡A
k   qw . (3)
By first-order stochastic dominance, it follows that in order to minimize expected wages,
the optimal distribution must satisfy (3) with equality. This implies that the optimal wage
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distribution is described by (1). Expected cost expression (2) follows from integration and
straightforward computations. ⌅
Further intuition for why random wages can improve on deterministic wages can be
obtained by considering small perturbations around deterministic wage ⇡Aq . Wage
⇡A
q deters
crime since a criminal agent finds it optimal to o↵er bribe ⌧ = ⇡A, which absorbs all the
potential profits from crime. Consider now setting a wage equal to ⇡Aq with probability 1  ✏
and equal to zero otherwise. Since the cost k of prosecution is strictly higher than ⇡A, for
✏ > 0 small enough, a criminal agent will still o↵er a bribe ⌧ = ⇡A. This lets the principal
deter crime at a lower expected cost of incentives.
In this simple environment, the savings that can be obtained using random incentives are
large: the cost of incentives goes from ⇡Aq for deterministic mechanisms, to less than
⇡A
q
⇡A
k
for the optimal random incentive scheme. For instance, if the penalty for crime is greater
than twice its benefits, i.e. k   2⇡A, the principal would be able to save more than 50% on
the cost of wages by using random incentives. The gains remain large even if we consider
simpler binary wage distributions.10
An example. Binary incentive distributions, boil down to establishing an elite class of
harder-to-corrupt monitors. This relates the policies we study to the real-life use of “un-
dercover tactics as a routine part of the inspection process” (Marx, 1992). In one example,
Operation Ampscam, that took place in New York City, police agents posed as electrical
installation inspectors, and arrested contractors who attempted to pay bribes in order to get
poor-quality work approved. Undercover police inspectors play the role of hard-to-corrupt
monitors in our model. Even if bribing police inspectors is possible, their presence reduces
the payo↵s of criminal agents by leaving them with two unattractive options. They can either
make a high bribe o↵er that all monitors accept, or make a low bribe o↵er that undercover
10For the optimal binary wage distribution, the share of costs saved using random incentives is equal to
1  ⇡A/k. It puts probability 1  ⇡A/k on w = 0 and probability ⇡A/k on w = ⇡A/q.
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police inspectors reject. From the perspective of our model, the fact that Operation Amp-
scam led to arrests is consistent with the outcome in which criminal agents make low bribe
o↵ers that undercover police inspectors reject, and get punished with positive probability.
4 Pre-existing Asymmetric Information
Are random incentives robustly optimal? The e ciency gains from using random
incentives are large in this simple example. Relaxing the assumptions of e ciency wages
and take-it-or-leave-it-bargaining does not overturn the optimality of random incentives (see
the Online Appendix). Pre-existing asymmetric information poses a more fundamental chal-
lenge. Indeed, it is intuitive that complete information should overstate the value of random
incentives. Under complete information, random incentives are the only private information
allowing the monitor to extract rents from criminal agents.
We return to the general model of Section 2. The monitor experiences a weakly positive
private cost ⌘ ⇠ F⌘ for falsifying information, and at the bargaining stage the agent makes
the o↵er with probability   and the monitor makes the o↵er with probability 1   . Given
a distribution of wages Fw, a criminal agent of type ⇡A gets an expected payo↵ equal to
UA(⇡A) = ⇡A   k +   max
⌧2[0,⇡A]
(k   ⌧)prob(qw + ⌘ < ⌧).
The expression above follows from two observations. First, a monitor with wage w and type
⌘ accepts bribe ⌧ from a criminal agent if and only if ⌧ > qw+⌘. Second, a monitor demands
bribe ⌧   k when she acts as proposer at the collusion stage and the agent is criminal, since
k is the highest price criminal agents are willing to pay for a report m = 0.11
As in Section 3, a monitor’s optimal continuation strategy is to send a truthful report
m = c if no agreement is reached at the collusion stage. This implies that non-criminal
agents get a payo↵ equal to 0.
11Specifically, the monitor demands a bribe ⌧ = k if k   qw+ ⌘, and a bribe ⌧ > k (which she expects to
be rejected) when k < qw + ⌘.
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Policy design under budget constraints. Given a distribution of wages Fw, an agent
of type ⇡A will engage in crime if and only if UA(⇡A) > 0. Note that UA(⇡A) is increasing in
⇡A, so that given a wage profile, agents follow a threshold strategy.
The principal’s problem can be decomposed as follows. Given a target threshold ⇡⇤A,
find the cheapest wage distribution that implements this threshold. The global optimum
can then be found by maximizing over the threshold ⇡⇤A. Alternatively, we can consider the
dual problem of a principal who operates under budget constraint EFw [w] = w0. Given a
distribution of wages Fw, let us denote by ⇡A(Fw) the value of ⇡A for which an agent is
indi↵erent between actions c = 0 and c = 1. Given budget w0, the principal’s problem is to
find the distribution of wages Fw that maximizes threshold ⇡A(Fw) subject to EFw [w] = w0
— this is the crime-minimizing wage schedule, given budget w0. The overall optimum can
then be obtained by optimizing over budget w0.
In what follows, we focus on the fixed budget version of the principal’s problem. We
emphasize that our population interpretation of the model means that the principal can
satisfy budget constraint EFw [w] = w0 exactly while using a non-degenerate distribution of
wages. The fixed-budget approach is appealing for additional reasons. First, it is realistic:
organizations frequently operate within fixed budgets set by other decision-makers. Second,
fixed budgets support the principal’s ability to commit to mixed strategies. Indeed, taking
agent behavior as given, the principal is indi↵erent over distributions F˜w satisfying EF˜w [w] =
w0.
When is additional asymmetric information desirable? Under pre-existing private
information, the optimality of random incentives depends on the shape of distribution F⌘.
Definition 1. We say that a wage profile with c.d.f. Fw is random if and only if the support
of Fw contains at least two elements.
Proposition 2 (ambiguous optimal policy). (i) Whenever F⌘ is strictly concave
over the range [0, k], the crime-minimizing wage profile under any budget w0 > 0
is random.
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(ii) Whenever F⌘ is strictly convex over the range [0, k], the crime-minimizing
wage profile under any budget w0 > 0 is deterministic.
To get some intuition for this result, consider an agent’s payo↵ from taking action c = 1:
UA(⇡A) = ⇡A   k +   max
⌧2[0,⇡A]
(k   ⌧)prob(qw + ⌘ < ⌧)
= ⇡A   k +   max
⌧2[0,⇡A]
(k   ⌧)EFw [F⌘(⌧   qw)].
If F⌘ is strictly convex over the support of ⌧   qw, a criminal agent is e↵ectively risk-loving
and she obtains a higher payo↵ from a random wage schedule than from a deterministic one
with the same expectation. Inversely, if F⌘ is strictly concave over the support of ⌧   qw,
a criminal agent is e↵ectively risk-averse and her payo↵ from a random wage schedule is
smaller than her payo↵ from a deterministic one with the same expectation.
If F⌘ is neither concave nor convex over [0, k] we can still provide su cient conditions
for random wage profiles to be optimal. Fix a deterministic wage w0 > 0 and denote by
⌧0 the highest solution to a criminal agent’s optimal bribe problem when the monitor is
compensated with a deterministic wage w0,
max
⌧
(k   ⌧)prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧).
Proposition 3 (su cient condition for random incentives). Whenever ⌧0  k2 , the crime-
minimizing policy given budget w0 is random.
If starting from a deterministic wage, the agent’s optimal bribe is less than half the cost
of prosecution, it is optimal to use random wages. The proof exploits the fact that c.d.f. F⌘
cannot be convex over arbitrarily large ranges of values.12 The assumption that ⌧0  k2 lets
us exploit non-convexities of F⌘ around w0 to construct random wage schedules that improve
12Note that ⌧0  k2 implies that F⌘ is not convex over [0, k]. Indeed, optimal bribe ⌧0 must satisfy the
first-order condition f⌘(⌧0   qw0)(k   ⌧0) = F⌘(⌧0   qw0). The convexity of F⌘ over [0, k] implies that
F⌘(⌧0   qw0)  f⌘(⌧0   qw0)(⌧0   qw0) < f⌘(⌧0   qw0)(k   ⌧0), where the last inequality uses ⌧0  k2 and
w0 > 0.
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on fixed wages.
We note that when distribution F⌘ is log-concave, i.e.
F⌘(·)
f⌘(·) is increasing, optimal bribe
⌧0 is increasing in w0. As a result, the condition of Proposition 3 is more likely to hold when
the principal’s budget w0 is small.
Because adding further asymmetric information does not necessarily improve incentive
provision, correct policy design must depend on the restrictions, subjective or objective, that
the principal can impose on the environment. However, specifying beliefs is often di cult
for principals, which makes actual implementation di cult. To address the issue, we show
in the next section that it is possible to perform prior-free policy evaluations using naturally
occurring unverifiable report data.
5 Prior-free Policy Evaluation
We now show that it is possible to evaluate potential local policy changes using reports from
monitors under su ciently rich existing policies. The main takeaway is that marginal policy
changes that, everything else equal, increase reports of crime, are local improvements. As a
result, na¨ıvely inferring crime from reporting data may lead to incorrect policy recommen-
dations. This result echoes findings from Iyer et al. (2012). In a study of policy changes
taking place in India in the early 1990s, the authors show that increased representation of
women in local government led to increased reports of crimes against women, but reduced
actual crime rates.
Na¨ıve inference fails. We first show that a na¨ıve use of reporting data from policy
experiments fails to identify the e↵ect that a change in policy has on crime rates.
Consider a principal who is operating under a budget constraint. Given budget w0 > 0,
let F 0w be the deterministic policy under which all monitors are paid wage w0, and let F
1
w
be a non-degenerate wage distribution with EF 1w [w] = w0. We assume that wage policies
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F 0w and F
1
w are implemented over the same infinite population of exchangeable monitor and
agent pairs. We are interested in whether reporting data under the two policies can identify
which of them leads to lower crime.
For any policy decision d 2 {0, 1}, denote by Cd the proportion of criminal agents under
policy F dw. Let Rd be the fraction of monitors reporting m = 1 under policy F
d
w.
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Lemma 2 (unreliable aggregate reports). Consider any budget w0 > 0, and any random
incentive scheme F 1w such that EF 1w [w] = w0.
The ordering of reports R0 and R1 is consistent with any ordering of crime C0 and C1: for
any of the four possible pairs of orderings of reports and crime, i.e., R0 7 R1 and C0 7 C1,
there exist specifications of k, F⇡A and F⌘ that lead to this ordering.
In words, the ordering of aggregate reports places no restrictions on the e↵ect of random
incentives on crime. Intuitively, reports of crime depend on both the underlying rate of
crime and the monitors’ decisions to report it. A change in incentive patterns from F 0w to
F 1w changes both the agents’ decisions to engage in crime and their bribing behavior. As a
result, changes in aggregate reports from R0 to R1 do not always match changes in underlying
crime.
Local policy evaluation. We now show that an appropriate use of report data from
policies with non-degenerate wage distributions can be used to evaluate local policy changes.
We emphasize three aspects of our results:
• The principal need not to know any of the parameters of the environment: the cost
k imposed by the judiciary on criminal agents, the likelihood q of detection, and bar-
gaining power   need not be known.14
13More explicitly, let ⇡A(F dw) denote the type of an agent indi↵erent between actions c = 0 and c = 1 under
policy F dw. Let ⌧d be a criminal agent’s optimal bribe under policy F
d
w. We have that Cd = 1 F⇡A(⇡A(F dw))
and Rd = (1  F⇡A(⇡A(F dw)))⇥ probFdw(qw + ⌘ > ⌧d).
14These results contribute to a small literature on mechanism design with limited probabilistic sophisti-
cation. This includes maxmin optimal design (Hurwicz and Shapiro, 1978, Hartline and Roughgarden, 2008,
Chassang, 2013, Frankel, 2014, Madara´sz and Prat, 2014, Prat, 2014, Carroll, 2013), as well as data-driven
design (Segal, 2003, Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel, 2016, Brooks, 2014).
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• Inference relies on the variation in wages already present in a non-degenerate policy,
and does not require knowledge of equilibrium reporting data at the alternative policies.
• If the initial wage distribution is degenerate, a policy experiment is necessary to obtain
reporting data for alternative wages. However, it is not necessary to wait for equilib-
rium crime rates and reports to adjust to the modified wage distribution in order to
make policy inferences.
Take as given a non-degenerate wage distribution with cdf F 0w and density f
0
w. We think
of distribution F 0w as the policy that the principal currently has in place. Let f
1
w denote a
density satisfying
supp f 1w ⇢ supp f 0w and Ef0w [w] = Ef1w [w]. (4)
When current policy f 0w has full support over a range [w,w], the set of policies f
1
w satisfying
(4) is the set of budget-neutral policies with support in [w,w].
For any alternative policy f 1w and any ✏ 2 [0, 1], construct the mixture f ✏w = (1 ✏)f 0w+✏f 1w.
The proportion of criminal agents under policy f ✏w is C✏ = 1 F⇡A(⇡A(f ✏w)), where ⇡A(f ✏w) is
the payo↵-type of an agent indi↵erent between actions c = 0 and c = 1. We are interested in
whether a principal can use reporting data to evaluate the e↵ect that a local policy change
in direction f 1w (i.e., a marginal increase in ✏) has on the rate of crime.
Denote by rf1wC the gradient of equilibrium crime in policy direction f 1w:
rf1wC =
@C✏
@✏
  ✏=0.
With this notation, our goal is to evaluate the gradient of crime rf1wC for all directions f 1w.
A marginal move in the direction of f 1w is a local policy improvement whenever rf1wC < 0.
As an example, suppose the initial policy f 0w has support {wL, w0, wH}, with wL < w0 <
wH , and with most of its mass at wage w0. Consider a principal who is interested in evaluating
whether moving towards a policy with higher variance in incentives will lead to less crime.
In this case, policy f 1w would be the budget-neutral policy with support {wL, wH}.
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Let R0 denote the fraction of monitors reporting m = 1 under policy f 0w. For any wage
w 2 supp f 0w, let R(w|f 0w) be the fraction of monitors with wage w reporting m = 1 under
the current policy f 0w; i.e., R(w|f 0w) is the share of monitors with wage w who are matched
with a criminal agent and who reject equilibrium bribes under policy f 0w.
15 For any policy f 1w
such that supp f 1w ⇢ supp f 0w we can construct a counterfactual report of crime under wage
distribution f 1w, keeping the agents’ behavior constant, as follows:
R0(f
1
w) ⌘ Ef0w

R(w|f 0w)⇥
f 1w(w)
f 0w(w)
 
.
Counterfactual report R0(f 1w) is the fraction of monitors that would report m = 1 if the
principal were to change her policy to f 1w and agents continued to behave as if the policy
in place was f 0w. Counterfactual report R0(f
1
w) is obtained by re-weighting reports R(w|f 0w)
and only requires data from policy f 0w. The following result holds.
Proposition 4 (prior-free policy evaluation). There exists a fixed coe cient ⇢ > 0 such that
for all alternative policies f 1w,
rf1wC = ⇢
⇥
R0  R0(f 1w)
⇤
.
This implies that a small movement from f 0w to f
1
w will decrease crime (rf1wC < 0) if
and only if at policy f 0w, the counterfactual report of crime reweighted for distribution f
1
w
increases. In other words, it is optimal to move towards the policy f 1w such that, everything
else equal, would maximize the amount of reported crime. The proof is instructive.
Proof. For any policy fw, let ⇡A(fw) be the payo↵-type of an agent indi↵erent between
actions c = 0 and c = 1. Take as given an arbitrary policy f 1w. Under wage schedule
15More explicitly, for all w 2 supp f0w, R(w|f0w) = (1  F⇡A(⇡A(f0w)))⇥ prob(qw + ⌘ < ⌧0), where ⇡A(f0w)
is the cuto↵ agent type who is indi↵erent between c = 0 and c = 1 under policy f0w, and ⌧0 is the optimal
bribe under policy f0w.
20
f ✏w = (1  ✏)f 0w + ✏f 1w, the agent’s payo↵ U ✏A(⇡A) from action c = 1 is
U ✏A(⇡A) = ⇡A   k +  max⌧ (k   ⌧)
⇥
(1  ✏)probf0w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧) + ✏probf1w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧)
⇤
.
Let ⌧0 be the highest solution to this maximization problem for ✏ = 0.
By the Envelope Theorem, 8⇡A,
@U ✏A(⇡A)
@✏
   ✏=0 =  (k   ⌧0) ⇥probf1w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧0)  probf0w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧0)⇤
=  (k   ⌧0) 1
1  F⇡A(⇡A(f 0w))
⇥
R0  R0(f 1w)
⇤
,
The second equality above follows from two observations. First, mean reports of crime R0
are equal to the product of baseline crime rates times the probability that equilibrium bribes
are refused:
R0 = [1  F⇡A(⇡A(f 0w))]⇥ [1  probf0w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧0)].
Second, for any w˜ 2 supp f 0w, mean reports R(w˜|f 0w) are equal to the product of baseline
crime rates times the probability that a monitor with wage w˜ refuses the equilibrium bribe:
8w˜ 2 supp f 0w, R(w˜|f 0w) = [1  F⇡A(⇡A(f 0w))]⇥ [1  prob(qw˜ + ⌘ < ⌧0)]
) R0(f 1w) = [1  F⇡A(⇡A(f 0w))]⇥ [1  probf1w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧0)].
Since C✏ = probF⇡A (U
✏(⇡A)   0) = 1  F⇡A(⇡A(f ✏w)), it follows that
rf1wC =
@C✏
@✏
  ✏=0 = f⇡A(⇡A(f 0w))@U ✏A(⇡A)@✏   ✏=0
=
f⇡A(⇡A(f
0
w))
1  F⇡A(⇡A(f 0w))
 (k   ⌧0)
⇥
R0  R0(f 1w)
⇤
.
This proves Proposition 4. ⌅
21
Continuous policy improvement. The fact that local policy improvements can be iden-
tified with naturally occuring data authorizes a process of continuous policy improvement.
Starting from a policy f 0w, one can engage in gradient-descent by iteratively picking the di-
rection for policy improvement f 1w that generates the largest counterfactual report of crime.
Note that since accumulated policy-changes cease to be local changes, bribes and crime need
to adjust to equilibrium before incremental policy assessments can be made: the process is
necessarily gradual.
When F⌘ is strictly convex over [0, k] this process pushes initial policy f 0w towards fixed
deterministic wage w0. Indeed, for any policy f 1w,
R0  R0(f 1w) = [1  F⇡A(⇡A(f 0w))]⇥ [probf1w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧0)  probf0w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧0)]
= [1  F⇡A(⇡A(f 0w))]⇥ [Ef1w [F⌘(⌧0   qw)]  Ef0w [F⌘(⌧0   qw)]].
When F⌘ is strictly convex over [0, k], counterfactual reports R0(f 1w) are maximized by the
distribution that puts all its mass point at w0. Iterative policy improvement converges to
the global policy optimum identified in Proposition 2.
We note that in more general settings, this process (if it converges) will lead to a local
policy optimum, rather than a global policy optimum.
Experiments. Proposition 4 requires that the support of f 1w be included within the sup-
port of f 0w. When this is not the case, one can obtain an experimental measure R0(f
1
w) by
randomizing the wage of a small subset of monitors. The proof of Proposition 4 clarifies why
one need not wait for equilibrium bribes and crime to adjust in order to interpret the data
obtained from such an experiment. Under local policy changes, the equilibrium response of
criminal agents has a second order e↵ect on their payo↵s. As a result, partial equilibrium
responses are su cient to assess changes in the expected payo↵s of crime.
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Evaluating other policy interventions. The logic of Proposition 4 extends to policy
interventions that change truthful-reporting incentives qw+⌘ by a↵ecting the distribution of
preference parameter ⌘ rather than by changing wages w or scrutiny q. For instance, one may
consider recruiting monitors from di↵erent pools hoping that they may be more or less pro-
social. One may also be interested in the e↵ect of a monitor-training, or a morale-enhancing
program. In these cases, a local policy change corresponds respectively to marginally in-
creasing the share of monitors recruited from a particular pool, or marginally increasing the
share of monitors that undergo the training program. In all these cases, local policy changes
towards interventions that yield more reports of crime are policy improvements.
Caveats. There are caveats to the policy recommendations following from Proposition 4.
The assumptions needed for our results are that: 1) the policy change does not increase the
returns ⇡A to crime; 2) the behavior of a monitor depends only on her realized incentives to
report truthfully, qw + ⌘.
Hence, Proposition 4 would not be a↵ected if each monitor made an e↵ort decision
conditional on her realized incentives qw + ⌘, but it would be a↵ected if the overall policy
changed the monitors’ propensity to accept bribes. This could happen if monitors as a
group found the use of random incentives unfair.16 Alternatively, policy changes by the
principal may cause spite among agents, e↵ectively increasing the returns from crime. This
is a concern explored in Iyer et al. (2012), that our framework does not address.
6 Discussion
We explored the idea that random incentives can limit the cost of corruption by making
side-contracting between criminal agents and monitors more di cult. We show that while
the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved pre-existing patterns of private
information, it is possible to use naturally occurring data to guide policy choice. A policy
16If this is the case, scrutiny q may be a more appropriate policy variable than wage w.
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change is a local improvement if, everything else equal, it is associated with greater reports
of crime. The logic of this result extends to policies that a↵ect truthful-reporting incentives
through preferences. Possible implementations of the policies we study are closely related to
the use of undercover operations.
The remainder of this section discusses practical aspects of potential implementation as
well as alternative modeling choices.
Commitment and disclosure. We assume that the principal can commit to a distribu-
tion of incentives across the population of monitors, and that monitors cannot disclose their
incentives to agents. This is a natural assumption if heterogeneity in truth-telling incentives
qw is created through heterogeneity in scrutiny q. Attention constraints mean that the prin-
cipal will focus on a subset of monitors. Furthermore, being under scrutiny is unlikely to be
part of a verifiable formal contract.
If wages w are the relevant policy dimension, commitment to a distribution of wages
can be facilitated by first setting an aggregate budget, and then deciding how it should
be assigned. This limits the principal’s temptation to give all monitors a low wage. In
view of the literature on relational contracting (Bull, 1987, Baker et al., 1994, 2002) it is
plausible that aspects of compensation, such as promotion or bonuses may not be included
in a verifiable contract, but left to the discretion of the principal. Of course greater reliance
on the principal’s discretion is not without costs, since it creates potential room for abuse
on the principal’s side.
Heterogenous incentives without random wages. The use of heterogeneous wages
has distributional implications which stakeholders may find very unfair. This concern can
be alleviated while still generating appropriate heterogeneity in incentives.
To the extent that the intensity of scrutiny q does not a↵ect the welfare of the monitor
when she reports truthfully, varying scrutiny q has limited distributional consequences for
non-corrupt monitors. For this reason, it may be a more suitable policy instrument for
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practical implementation. Undercover police o cers are indeed under much more scrutiny
than regular city inspectors. More speculatively, in public infrastructure projects where, as in
Olken (2007), local o cials play the role of natural monitors, one could vary the probability
with which the project gets audited.
Alternatively, one may be able to generate heterogenous incentives without randomization
by letting the monitor’s wage depend deterministically on data that is observable to the
principal and the monitor, but not the agent. For instance, wages may be contingent on the
monitor’s tenure, diplomas, the number of crimes she has reported in the past, and so on.
Such compensation schemes also introduce heterogeneity in the monitors’ incentives, making
side-contracting more di cult than under schemes that reward monitors with constant wages.
Ex ante bargaining. Our model assumes that the monitor and the agent side-contract
after the agent chooses whether to engage in crime. This timing is reasonable in settings
where interaction between the monitor and agent is short-lived. For instance, environmental
and health inspectors may be rotated across a large number of sites.17 However, in settings
where agents and monitors repeatedly interact, the alternate timing, in which the agent and
the monitor bargain before crime happens, may be more plausible.
We show in the Online Appendix that the results of Sections 3 and 4 extend qualitatively
under this alternate timing. Endogenous asymmetric information can reduce the costs of
incentive provision, but its value depends on pre-existing patterns of asymmetric information.
Extending the policy evaluation results of Section 5 is more demanding. The di culty is that
when the monitor and the agent bargain ex ante, there is no report of crime in equilibrium.
If they come to an agreement, crime occurs but is not reported. If they do not come to an
agreement, crime does not occur. However, we show that reports of attempted corruption,
rather than reports of crime, can also be used to evaluate policy. The message is qualitatively
the same. Policy changes that increase reports of bribing attempts lower the equilibrium
17Reasons for rotation, as illustrated by Ohio’s EPA 2014 sta↵ rotation initiative, include fostering more
homogeneous standards, as well as increasing inspectors’ experience.
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number of bribing attempts, and reduce the underlying crime rate.18
Extortion. Our model assumes that the monitor sends a subgame-perfect message fol-
lowing disagreement at the side-contracting stage. This implies that the monitor can never
extract bribes from an agent which she observes to be non-criminal. As Olken and Pande
(2012) highlight, this prediction is frequently violated: non-criminal agents often have to pay
bribes. A simple variation of our baseline model accounts for this. Assume that when the
monitor has the bargaining power, she is able to commit to the message she would send in the
event of a bargaining failure. A monitor can then extract rents from an non-criminal agent
by committing to report the agent as criminal unless a bribe is paid. While this changes the
agent’s incentives to engage in crime, we show in the Online Appendix that our main results
continue to hold in this setting: random incentives may reduce the cost of corruption, and
it is possible to perform local policy evaluation using reporting data.
Arbitrary contracting between the principal and the monitor. Throughout the
paper we assumed that the monitor is compensated with a fixed wage contract w and gets
fired if she is caught misreporting. Under this assumption, Section 3 shows that determinis-
tic incentive schemes are expensive under collusion, and that the principal can significantly
reduce the cost of deterring crime by randomizing the monitor’s wage. These results continue
to hold if the principal can use arbitrary contracts to compensate the monitor. With more
sophisticated contracts, the principal can reduce the cost of deterring crime by o↵ering the
monitor a higher compensation whenever she sends report m = 1. Indeed, a high compen-
sation following report m = 1 increases the agent’s cost of bribing the monitor, and remains
cheap for the principal because it tends to be paid o↵ of the equilibrium path. However, the
assumption that reports are only partially verifiable (i.e. false reports are only detected with
probability q) limits the extent to which the principal can exploit such incentives. With par-
18Note that the specific results are di↵erent. While ranking the prevalence of bribery can be done using
bribing-attempts data from a single policy, equilibrium data from two candidate policies is needed to rank
crime rates. See the Online Appendix for details.
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tially verifiable reports, as the monitor’s compensation following message m = 1 gets large,
it becomes optimal for her to report crime regardless of the agent’s action. As a result, the
cost of deterring crime with deterministic incentives remains high, and, as we show in the
Online Appendix, the cost of keeping the agent non-criminal may be significantly reduced
by using random incentives.
Signaling by the monitor. One concern with random incentives is that the monitor
could signal her type. We address this issue in the Online Appendix by letting the agent and
monitor use arbitrary bargaining mechanisms. Because monitors with low-powered incentives
benefit from pooling with high-powered monitors, it is impossible for monitors to perfectly
signal their types. As a result the principal still benefits from using random incentives.
Participation constraints. Throughout the paper we assume that the monitor is risk-
neutral, so that randomness in wages does not make participation constraints more di cult
to satisfy. Risk-aversion on the monitor’s side may restrain the use of random wages, but our
qualitative results continue to hold in that case. The reason for this is that under collusion,
participation is not binding. Indeed, in Section 3 we show that the cost of keeping the agent
non-criminal with deterministic incentives is equal to ⇡Aq , compared to an outside option of
0. This means that the principal can use random incentives without a↵ecting the monitor’s
participation constraint.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. The agent’s payo↵ from taking action c = 1 is
UA(⇡A) = ⇡A   k +   max
⌧2[0,⇡A]
(k   ⌧)prob(qw + ⌘ < ⌧)
= ⇡A   k +   max
⌧2[0,⇡A]
(k   ⌧)EFw [F⌘(⌧   qw)].
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Consider first the case in which F⌘ is strictly concave over [0, k]. Let ⌧0 be the highest solution
to the optimal bribe problem under a deterministic wage w0 (i.e., max⌧ (k ⌧)F⌘(⌧ qw0)) and
note that ⌧0 > qw0. Let Fw be a random wage distribution with EFw [w] = w0 and support
[w0    , w0 +  ], with   > 0 small enough such that ⌧0 > q(w0 +  ). For any ✏ 2 [0, 1], let
F ✏w = (1  ✏)1w=w0 + ✏Fw; i.e., F ✏w is the mixture between a deterministic wage w0 and policy
Fw. Since F⌘ is strictly concave over [0, k], (k ⌧)EF ✏w [F⌘(⌧ qw)] < (k ⌧)F⌘(⌧ qw0) for all
⌧ close to ⌧0. For each ✏ 2 [0, 1], let ⌧✏ be the highest solution to max⌧ (k ⌧)EF ✏w [F⌘(⌧ qw)].
Since ⌧✏ is close to ⌧0 for ✏ small, it follows that
(k   ⌧✏)EF ✏w [F⌘(⌧✏   qw)] < (k   ⌧✏)F⌘(⌧✏   qw0)  (k   ⌧0)F⌘(⌧0   qw0),
where the last inequality follows since ⌧0 solves max⌧ (k  ⌧)F⌘(⌧   qw0). It follows that for ✏
small the expected payo↵ a criminal agent obtains under F ✏w is strictly smaller than the one
she obtains under the deterministic wage w0.
Consider next the case in which F⌘ is strictly convex over [0, k]. Note that for any ran-
dom wage distribution Fw with EFw [w] = w0, F⌘(·) is convex over the support of ⌧   qw
for all ⌧ 2 [0, ⇡A]. Therefore, in this case the agent’s payo↵ from being criminal under any
random wage distribution with mean w0 is larger than under the deterministic policy w0. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3. For   > 0, consider the random wage w˜✏ defined by
w˜✏ =
(
w0   ✏ with proba   +✏
w0 +  with proba
✏
 +✏ .
The expected payo↵ of a criminal agent under random wage w˜✏ is
UA(⇡A|w˜✏) = ⇡A   k +  max
⌧
(k   ⌧)probw˜✏(qw + ⌘ < ⌧).
By the Envelope Theorem,
@UA(⇡A|w˜✏)
@✏
  ✏=0 =  (k ⌧0)

  1
 
prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧0) +
1
 
prob(q[w0 + ] + ⌘ < ⌧0) + qf⌘(⌧0   qw0)
 
.
Bribe ⌧0, which solves max⌧ (k   ⌧)prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧), must be interior and therefore
satisfies the first order condition
(k   ⌧0)f⌘(⌧0   qw0)  prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧0) = 0) f⌘(⌧0   qw0) = prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧0)
k   ⌧0 .
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Setting   ⌘ ⌧0/q   w0, we obtain that
@UA(⇡A|w˜✏)
@✏
  ✏=0 = q(k   ⌧0)prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧0)

  1
⌧0   qw0 +
1
k   ⌧0
 
< 0
where we used the fact that ⌧0  12k ) k   ⌧0 > ⌧0   qw0.
Hence for ✏ small enough, using random wage distribution w˜✏ reduces crime compared to
deterministic wage w0. ⌅
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is by example. We proceed case by case and assume
throughout that   = 1. Denote by w and w the maximum and minimum values in the
support of F 1w. Note that w0 2 (w,w).
We first show that R0 < R1 can be consistent with C0 < C1. Consider the case where
k = qw0 , F⇡A is a mass point at k   ✏ with ✏ > 0, and F⌘ a mass point at 0. For any ✏ > 0,
R0 = C0 = 0. For ✏ > 0 small enough F 1w(w0  ✏) > 0, which implies that for ✏ small enough,
max
⌧
(k   ⌧)probF 1w(qw < ⌧) > k   ⇡A = ✏.
Hence for ✏ > 0 small enough, C1 = 1. Furthermore, for ✏ > 0 small enough, F 1w(w0+ ✏) < 1,
which implies that R1 > 0 since the agent never o↵ers a bribe ⌧   k = qw0.
Let us show that R0 < R1 can be consistent with C0 > C1. Set F⇡A with full support
over [0, k], and
⌘ =
(
⌘ with proba p
0 with proba 1  p
with both ⌘  ✏ and p  ✏. For k large enough and ✏ > 0 small enough, it is immediate that
max
⌧
(k   ⌧)probF 1w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧) < max⌧ (k   ⌧)prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧)
since as k grows large, it is optimal for the agent to o↵er bribes respectively converging to
w and w0, and w > w0. This implies that C0 > C1. Let us now show that we can set ⌘ and
p so that R0 < R1. A necessary and su cient condition to obtain R0 = 0 is
k   qw0   ⌘ > (k   qw0)(1  p) () k   qw0 > ⌘
p
. (5)
This condition expresses that it is optimal for the agent to o↵er a bribe ⌧ = qw0 + ⌘ rather
than ⌧ = qw0 under the deterministic wage w0. Similarly, under F 1w, a su cient condition
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to ensure that R1 > 0 is that the agent prefer o↵ering a bribe ⌧ = qw over bribe ⌧ = qw+ ⌘.
A su cient condition for this is that
k   qw   ⌘ < (k   qw)(1  p) () k   qw < ⌘
p
. (6)
Since w > w0, it is immediate that for any ✏, one can find values p, ⌘ < ✏, such that conditions
(5) and (6) hold simultaneously. For such values, R1 > R0 = 0, which yields the desired
result.
We now show that R0 > R1 can be consistent with C0 > C1. Set
⌘ =
(
⌘ with proba p
0 with proba 1  p
with both ⌘  ✏ and p  ✏. For k large enough and ✏ > 0 small enough, we have that
max
⌧
(k   ⌧)probF 1w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧) < max⌧ (k   ⌧)prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧).
Set F⇡A as a point mass at a value ⇡A such that
⇡A   k +max
⌧
(k   ⌧)probF 1w(qw + ⌘ < ⌧) < 0 < ⇡A   k +max⌧ (k   ⌧)prob(qw0 + ⌘ < ⌧)
for all ✏ small enough. This implies that C0 = 1 > C1 = 0. In turn we obtain that R1 = 0.
Finally, by choosing p and ⌘ such that (5) does not hold, one can ensure that R0 > 0.
Finally, we show that R0 > R1 can be consistent with C0 < C1. Set ⌘ = 0, k = qw0  12✏
and
⇡A =
(
k + ✏ with proba p
k with proba 1  p.
It is immediate that C0 = p and R0 = p. Furthermore, since max⌧ (k ⌧)probF 1w(qw+⌘ < ⌧)
is strictly positive and bounded away from 0 for ✏ small enough, it follows that for ✏ small
enough C1 = 1 and R1 < 1. For p large enough, R0 > R1. This concludes the proof. ⌅
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